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NOTES AND COMMENT
ADmISSIBILITY IN FEDERAL COURTS OF EVIDENCE WRONGFULLY
OBTAINED BY PERSONS OTHER TAN FEDERAL OFFICERS OR BY
COOPERATION BETWEEN SUCH PERSONS AND FEDERAL OFFICERS--
It is a firmly established rule in the federal courts, that evidence
obtained by an illegal search and seizure, within the purview of
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
is not admissible providing timely steps are taken for its exclusion
or return.' However, that rule is limited in its application to
federal officers or agents, so that quite generally it may be said,
that evidence obtained by private,mdividuals or municipal or state
officers, acting as such, is admissible in federal courts, regardless
of the manner in which it is obtained.
Thus in Weeks v. United States2 it was held that lottery tickets
and papers secured through an illegal search and seizure by a
United States marshal, were not admissible in evidence, when a
IBoyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1886)
Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, L. R. A. 1915 B,
834, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 1177 (1913).
See Note 1, supra.
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seasonable application was made for their return. But papers
seized by police officers in the same manner, were competent evi-
dence, because "the Fourth Amendment is not directed to in-
dividual misconduct of such officials. Its limitations reach the
Federal Government and its agencies."
In Burdeau v. McDowell,3 which is the leading case on this
point, papers stolen by private citizens and later turned over to
the Attorney General, were held to be competent evidence. No
officers or agents of the United States Government took any part
in securing the papers nor did they know of it until after the
papers were turned over to them. The court says, therefore, that
there was no invasion of the security afforded by the Fourth
Amendment, since its origin and history show that it was intended
as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority and was
not intended as a limitation upon other than governmental agencies.
Likewise where a private diary of the defendant was seized by
British authorities at Capetown, South Africa, and turned over to
United States authorities, the diary was admissible in evidence.'
It would seem that this doctrine afforded a comfortable method
of circumventing the Fourth Amendment, by enabling federal
officers to make arrangements with state or municipal officers to
search for evidence in any manner whatsoever, to be turned over
immediately to the federal authorities for prosecution. And this
seems to have been done, especially with reference to liquor, but
the courts promptly interfered with such a practice whenever it
could be shown that the state or municipal officers were in any way
acting as agents of the federal government in making the search
and seizure, and, if so, the evidence so secured was subjected to
the same scrutiny as if it had been obtained by federal officers.
Thus in Flagg v. United States5 police officers made an illegal
seizure of defendant's papers and turned them over immediately
to the Postal authorities. The court held that the evidence was not
admissible, because the officers must have been acting as accredited
agents of the United States and so the search was made by the
United States, through its agents, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. And where state officers made an unlawful search
and turned the evidence over to federal officers, in accordance
with their general practice, it was held that the evidence was not
admissible, because in effect, the officers were recognized federal
agents and their acts had to be governed by the limitations im-
posed by the federal constitution. And In re Schuetze' the court
says that to make the search in effect one by the federal governmen,
it is not necessary that the police have specific orders to make the
1256 U. S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574, 65 L. ed. 1048, 13 A. L. R. 1159 (1921).
Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented.
Pedersen et al. v. U. S., 271 Fed. 187 (1921)
233 Fed. 481 (1916)
U. S. v. Fafloco, 277 Fed. 75 (1922).
'299 Fed. 827 (1924).
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search in question, it being sufficient if there is a general arrange-
ment or express or implied understanding that the police will make
searches and then turn the evidence over to the federal officers. 8
Then in Gambino et al v. United States9 the Supreme Court made
a further extension of the agency rule. State troopers in New York
made an unlawful search and seizure of defendants' car and the
evidence was turned over to federal officers. The search was not
made in co-operation with or as agents of, federal officials, but at
that time the state enforcement act had been repealed and the state
officers believed that they were required by law to aid in enforcing
the National Prohibition Act. They made the arrest and search solely
for the purpose of aiding federal prosecution. It was held that
the evidence was not admissible as the wrongful search and seizure
was made solely on behalf of the United States. This case was dis-
tiguished from the Weeks' case'0 and Burdeau v. McDowell" in
that in neither of those two cases did it appear that the search and
seizure were made for the purpose alone, of aiding the United
States in the enforcement of its laws.
The next question arises as to the admissibility of evidence se-
cured by an illegal search in which both federal, and state or
municipal officers or private citizens participate. These cases,
more than the preceding ones, are decided so much on the facts of
each case, that an extended review of the cases will not be made,
but merely an outline given of the tendency of the decisions.
The courts have taken several views. One is that in such cases
the federal officers may be participating m the search in the
capacity of private citizens, so that regardless of the validity of the
search, the evidence is competent in a federal court. This is prob-
ably the basis of the decision in Crawford v. United States12 where
evidence secured by police accompanied by a federal prohibition
agent was held admissible. The court stresses the fact that there
was no display of federal authority
But the best view would seem to be that the participation of
federal officers in an illegal search and seizure, of itself, renders
the evidence incompetent m a federal court, and this is supported
by some of the later cases. It seems a quibble to say that the
federal officer is concerned solely as a private citizen, for obviously
in almost every case his presence on a search is requested solely for
the reason that violations of federal laws are likely to be observed.
And it would be impossible to say, that a certain portion of ev-
dence was secured by a federal officer and therefore not competent,
but that another portion of the evidence secured by the searching
ISee the same rule expressed in U. S. v. Dosss, 12 Fed (2nd) 956 (1926),
and V. S. v. Costanzo et al., 13 Fed (2nd) 259 (1926), where the federal
prohibition agent had made an arrangement whereby police entered homes
without a search warrant and turned the evidence over to him.
- U. .S- 48 Sup. Ct. 137, 72 L. ed. - (1927).
"'See Note 1, supra.
1 See Note 3, supra.
"2 5 Fed. (2nd) 672 (1925).
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party was obtained by state officers and therefore competent.
Hence the general rule may be laid down, that where federal offi-
cers participate in a wrongful search and seizure, with state or
municipal officers or private citizens, the evidence so secured will
not be admissible in a federal court, providing of course, that time-
ly steps are taken for its exclusion or return.1 3
Thus, in Legman v. United States14 a conviction was reversed,
since it was based in part upon evidence secured through an illegal
search by government officials working in cooperation with state
officers. This case indicates that it might be possible to use
such evidence as was secured by the state officers alone, or in other
words, as mentioned above, that the evidence might be sub-divided
and that which was secured solely through the efforts of the state
officers admitted in evidence. But this is obiter dictum for the
purposes of this case, and it would seem that it is wholly impractic-
able to try and make any such refined division of evidence secured
on a search conducted jointly by both state and federal officers.
Who can say, how much of the evidence is secured, without some
help, direct or indirect from the othersl
And this theory of segregation of the evidence, if it may be
called that, is impliedly rejected in the case of Byars v United
States."' The prosecution was based on counterfeit stamps, secured
by an illegal search conducted by municipal officers, and a fed-
eral agent. Some of the stamps were found by the federal agent
in one room, and some by the police in another room and turned
over to the federal officer while they were still in the house. The
court says, that evidence secured by a wrongful search and seizure,
in which the federal government, through its agents, participates,
cannot be used in a federal court in a prosecution against those
defendants. The court does not say that only the evidence secured
by the federal agent was incompetent, while that found by the
police was competent, but that all of the evidence was inadmiss-
ible.
In this case and in Thompson v. United States6 the court in an
obiter dictum says, that the mere participation of a federal agent
in an illegal search, does not render evidence secured incompetent
in a federal court, but neither court gives us any indication of
what "mere participation" would be. As stated above, it would
be difficult to conceive of a case where a federal officer partici-
pates in any search, merely as a disinterested private citizen.
In summary, the situation in the federal courts seems to be this.
Evidence secured by federal officers acting alone or in conjunc-
tion with state or municipal officers or private citizens, by means
of an illegal search and seizure, will not be admitted in evidence,
if the proper procedural steps are taken for its suppression or re-
"Marrow et al. v. U. S., 8 Fed. (2nd) 251 (1925) Thompson v. U S.,
22 Fed (2nd) 134 (1927).
11295 Fed. 474 (1924).
273 U. S. 28, 47 Sup. Ct. 248, 71 L. ed. 520 (1926)
"See Note 13, supra.
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turn. Evidence secured by private citizens or officers of other
jurisdictions, is admissible regardless of the manner in which it is
obtained, unless they were acting under express orders from federal
officers on that occasion or unless they acted in accordance with a
general understanding with federal officers, or unless they intended
to act solely on behalf of the federal government, even if there was
no previous understanding, express or implied, that they should
do so.
MIARIoN A. MARQUIs.
RECENT CASES
CoNnrroNAL SALES-SIGNATURE OF VEiNDOR. A salesman for the vendor
secured an order for certain machinery. The order was made out on a
conditional sale contract form which provided that the contract was sub-
ject to the approval of the vendbr at its home office. The name of the
vendor corporation was printed beneath the signature of the salesman,
and appeared again at the end of the form accompanied by blanks for the
personal signature of the proper approving officer. No such signature was
ever entered, but the goods were delivered and the form filed within
ten days. In this action by the vendor to recover the goods from the
vendee's receiver after default in payments, held, that the sale was abso-
lute as to the receiver, there being no signature by the vendor as required
by Rem. Comp. Stat. sec. 3790. State ex rel. Yates American MachiLne Co.
v. Superior Court, 47 Wash. Dec. 244, 266 Pac. 134 (1928).
The rule of the case is not new in this state. Jennings v. Schwartz, 82
Wash. 209, 144 Pac. 39 (1914) Kennery v. Northwestern Junk Co., 108
Wash. 656, 185 Pac. 636, 190 Pac. 330 (1919) Rychen 'v. Tacoma Farmers'
Creamery, 127 Wash. 359, 220 Pac. 780 (1923) Seymour v. Landon, 128
Wash. 682, 224 Pac. 3 (1924). The decision rests solely on the doctrine of
stare decisis, and Justice Tolman concurring specially denounces it as
illogical in light of the Statute of Frauds cases and recommends that the
court unite in a reversal of the rule so often laid down.
It must be conceded that handwriting is not the. only valid form of
signature. Stamped, printed or typewritten names have been consistently
recognized as proper signatures. 36 Cyc. 448. It is necessary only that
the signer adopt such symbols as his signature. Weston v. Myers, 33 Ill.
424 (1864) Midkiff v. Johnson County Savtngs Bank, 144 S. W 705 (Tex.
1912).
In the principal case, there being nothing to indicate express adoption,
it must appear if at all by implication from the facts of delivery of the
goods and filing of the document. Delivery might be referable to an abso-
lute sale, but the filing would seem to be sufficiently conclusive evidence
of adoption of the printed name as a signature binding on the vendor.
Opposed to this there is only the suggestion arising from the blanks that
the instrument is to be completed in a certain way. In this respect the
Statute of Frauds cases and those involving wills and commercial paper
are distinguishable, but there seems no very good reason why the vendor
may not waive provisions inserted solely for its own benefit. The Wash-
ington cases cited proceed on the theory that policy demands a stricter
rule in conditional sales cases to protect third persons. However, it would
seem that an examination of the records would certainly apprise a third
person of sufficient facts as to the vendee's interest in the property.
Directly opposed to the doctrine of the principal case is In re Coving-
ton Lumber Co., 225 Fed. 444 (1914), decided in the local federal court
shortly prior to the first of the Washington cases. In the later case of In
re Frankel, 225 Fed. 129 (1915), the same court seems to explain its former
decision on the ground that the contract was signed by the salesman. This
